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This paper examines the possibilities o f encountering the Shoah 
through testimony and asks what kind o f  relations we can enter into 
with it. It contrasts the power o f traditional philosophy, the power 
to organize, gather, and assimilate, with encounter and difference. 
Both are relations, hut the first, a relation o f knowledge, is a power 
relation, wherein alterity is subsumed and neutralized beneath the 
desire for omnipresent unity. The second is a relation not of power 
but o f  difference, wherein alterity and difference are affirmed.
The paper argues that a deep sense o f responsibility is born out of 
encountering Shoah testimony, and it relies heavily on the thought o f  
Maurice Blanchot and Emmanuel Levinas to make this argument. In 
encountering the Other, we are bound to the Other and must answer 
to and for her. While no response is adequate to the enormity of the 
Shoah’s destruction, a response must nevertheless be made. Thus, as 
the inheritors o f a history, o f  our particular history, we must respond 
to the horrors o f  the Shoah.
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P reface
During my first encounter with Shoah testimony, I felt an 
inexpressible failure, a failure that bordered on guilt. This sense o f  
failure stemmed not only from the inadequacy o f my philosophical 
ability to make sense out o f  the horrible, but was rooted in the 
personal encounter itself. Each time I opened a book o f testimony I 
stood in some sense accused, my failure exposed and driven out into 
the open, even though, as I said, it was an inexpressible failure. I 
felt the need to respond, and felt the equally strong frustration o f  
lacking an adequate response. The following pages try to give body 
to this failure, to this inexpressible sense o f accusation.
But how does one express the inexpressible? It is a question 
that permeates any study o f  the Shoah, and thus, has a rightful place 
in a study o f our responsibility. One begins, I think, by questioning 
the bounds o f expression, by questioning the bounds o f what is 
meant by "expressing." What is the encounter? What is knowledge? 
But our questions must push further than even these fundamental 
questions. Is knowledge here possible? Does encounter preclude 
knowledge? Is it a prelude to knowledge? And so on. Thus, in 
many ways, this piece questions philosophy itself. It questions its 
ability to answer to all o f  our relations, and it questions its focus on 
being and knowledge as the primary aspects o f human life.
It is for these reasons that I turned to the thought o f  
Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Blanchot, for it seems to me that, 
with Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze, these two philosophers have
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put philosophy into question in just these ways. But even more 
importantly, there is a focus on the ethical so vivid and central to 
these thinkers that their very voices resonated deeply with my 
(inadequately expressed) concerns about responsibility and failure. 
Here, in the radical phenomenology o f  these two thinkers, was a 
language that, while still unable to express the inexpressible, could 
delineate this sense o f responsibility and its occultation.
Thus, there are two threads to the following pages. The first 
focuses on the inablity o f  philosophy to answer to our relations with 
testimony and the Shoah itself. Philosophy is power, the power to 
assimilate, to organize, and to control. What philosophy, which is in 
this sense despotic, fears is alterity, that which falls outside its 
bounds. The occultation o f  responsibility arises out o f philosophical 
thinking, at least philosophy as we traditionally think o f it, because 
philosophy's ability to occupy thought neutralizes any sense o f the 
other and alterity.
The second thread rests on Levinas' sense o f responsibility. For 
Levinas, the encounter with the Other strips me o f my power to 
assimilate, and thus, I am in a relation not of power, as in the 
knowledge relation, but o f immediacy. Here, the Other presides over 
me infinitely, and I must respond. This notion o f responsibility 
resonates deeply with the sense o f  failure I feel when encountering 
Shoah testimony. I am powerless before the Other, before the 
testimony o f  the Other, and thus am bound to the Other.
A different relation begins to reveal itself, oiie not defined by power 
and assimilation, but by difference.
iv
But many important questions remain. What do I have to say 
about the Shoah? Indeed, what do any o f us, we who did not 
experience life in the camps or in the deadly Eastern countryside, 
have to say about this singular, burning moment? O f course, in a 
sense, this piece is m y response to this question. To remember, to 
encounter, and to respond are not options, but integral parts of our 
responsibility. And though the sense o f failure remains, probably 
w ill always remain, here is a response. Is it an adequate response? 
Certainly not. What would an adequate response be?
1 have not seen it m yself, but 1 have heard that behind Notre 
Dame there is, buried in the ground, accessible only by a steep 
staircase, an unmarked Shoah memorial. From what 1 hear, it is very 
simple. Is this the adequate response, an unmarked memorial? Is 
this silent symbol adequate? Since 1 have heard o f this memorial, 1 
have always thought it would seem more appropriate to fill it in, to 
bulldoze dirt and crushed cement staircase and metal handrails into 
the hole, to cover and bury it. Think o f it down there in the cold 
ground. But a terrible silence, too, is inadequate. And we are left 
only with the imperative o f  a strong pessimism: through all the 
inadequacy and failure, an approach must be made.
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You who live safe 
In your warm houses.
You who find, returning in the evening.
Hot food and friendly faces;
Consider i f  this is a man 
Who works in the mud 
Who does not know peace 
Who fights for a scrap o f  bread 
Who dies because o f  a yes or a no.
Consider i f  this is a woman.
Without hair and without name 
With no more strength to remember.
Her eyes empty and her womb cold 
Like a frog in winter.
Meditate that this came about:
I commend these words to you.
Carve them in your hearts 
At home, in the street.
Going to bed, rising;
Repeat them to your children.
Or may your house fall apart.
May illness impede you.
May your children turn their faces from you.
—Primo Levi 
Survival in Auschwitz^
* Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz, trans. by Stuart W oolf (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996) 11.
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Chapter 1
A. Encountering the Other
The Shoah continues to make demands upon us. Auschwitz, as 
Maurice Blanchot tells us, makes a "ceaseless appeal" to us, an appeal
which cannot be satisfied, where the accounts w ill never be
balanced.2 The horrible occurred there...but the articulation o f this 
horror, the coming to grips with it, is in constant elusion. We are left 
with an unanswerable obligation, an infinite duty: to respond to the 
horrible, to respond to Auschwitz, the moment when the horrible 
became compulsive, when the horrible became routine.
We cite the entirety o f  Primo Levi's curse because Levi here 
names the demand, and not only his demand, but the demand of 
Shoah testimony. Levi calls us to consider the Other. "Consider if  
this is a man...": consider this man here, in the mud, scraping for food. 
He, too, is a man. This woman, without hair and with a cold womb: 
she, too, is a woman. And i f  you do not consider them, if  you do not 
turn to them, "may your house fall apart...."
Levi's curse is the demand to face the Other. To turn ourselves
toward this Other, toward the speaking o f  this Other. This pre-face, 
this fore-word, is the calling-us-toward-the-word o f the Other, the 
turning o f  our faces toward the Other. Levi is opening the moment o f  
responsibility, m ak in g  the demand, thus his imperative tone.
2 Maurice Blanchot, “Do Not Forget,” from The Blanchot Reader, ed. and trans. 
by M ichael Holland (Cambridge, Massachusettes: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 
1995) 247.
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"Consider if  this is a man..."; this is a man, a human, another human 
being, even here in the mud. As Robert Antelme says, "The SS 
cannot alter our species. They are themselves enclosed within the 
same h u m a n k i n d . . . . T h i s  is a man: like the SS who deign to destroy 
him, this one in the mud is a human being. This one in the mud, this 
man; Levi opens the first door o f responsibility.
But what is Levi calling us toward? Toward the telling, toward 
his telling, toward his testimony. The curse wrenches us toward his 
testimony. For he asks us to consider i f  this is a man, and this is, 
first o f  all, even before the first, even before the considering, a 
calling toward the Other. The curse is Levi making the demand o f  
the Other, the demand to be en cou n te red .  And this is why it is a 
pre-face, a fore-word, for it comes before the word, before the 
telling. It calls us to turn and face the telling, this telling o f  Levi's 
experience o f  the ultimately horrible, which is still the experience o f  
a man.
This encounter with the Other, what is it? It, too, is first and 
foremost a demand, the demand to respond. Levi's demand, the 
demand to encounter this Other, this man, is the demand, too, to bear 
witness, to bear out this telling. We must listen to the Other. But 
what would this listening be? What would this encounter be?
"The relation with the other is not...ontology," Emmanuel 
Levinas tells us.^ Here we sense a radical formulation, because the
 ̂ Robert Antelme, The Human Race, trans. Jeffrey Haight and Annie Mahler 
(Evanston: The Marlboro Press/Northwestern, 1998) 74
Emmanuel Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental?,” from Basic Philosophical 
W rit in g s ,  ed. by Adrian T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi,
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Other, if  Levinas is correct, is not encountered in being, or at least the 
encounter cannot be reduced to being. Ontology, according to 
Levinas, is the reduction o f  the other to the same, the neutralization 
o f alterity. O f Heideggerian ontology, he writes, "The understanding 
o f  a being...consist[s] in going beyond that being into the openness [of 
being] and in perceiving it upon the horizon o f  being The 
comprehension o f a being, then, for Heidegger, is to understand that 
being within an overall framework or horizon. Thus, "To 
comprehend is to be related to the particular that only exists through 
knowledge, which is always knowledge o f  the universal.
Levinas' critique o f  ontology rests on the commitment of  
ontology to neutralize alterity and reduce the other to the conditions 
o f the same. In Totality and Infinity he writes, "The relation with 
Being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralizing the existent 
in order to comprehend or grasp it. It is hence not a relation with 
the other as such but the reduction o f  the other to the same."^ 
Ontology does not sustain a relation with the other as other 
(whatever that may be), but rather, neutralizes alterity in order to 
comprehend the existent. A certain economy o f reduction is under 
way in ontology, an economy o f violence.
Thus, even comprehension, which we might at first believe to 
be Levi's desired effect in his testimony (that we might unders tand) ,  
cannot be our encounter. As Blanchot says,"Even comprehension...is a
trans. by Simon Critchley, Peter Atterton, and Graham Noctor (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1996) 7.
5 Ibid., 5. A ll emphases are the author’s unless otherwise indicated.
6 Ibid., 5.
 ̂ Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh; 
Duquesne University Press, 1969) 45-6.
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grasp that gathers the diverse into a unity, identifies the different, 
and brings the other back to the same through a reduction...."* To 
comprehend: to bring back under the unity o f the same, to reduce 
alterity in the hopes o f knowledge, etc. No, there is an even more 
fundamental encounter (we hesitate to even use the term 
fundamental), which is ' the encounter with the Other.
Levi's curse, as we have said, is his fore-word, the calling-us- 
toward-the-word o f the Other. It is s a y in g  in the sense Levinas gives 
to the term: addressing the Other. Saying is "the proximity o f one to 
the other, the commitment o f  an approach.. . Here, the emphasis is 
not on content, not on the sa id ,  but on the very speaking, the saying, 
itself. This saying draws us toward the Other, commits us, as Levinas 
says, to an approach to the Other. Levi's curse is the demand to 
approach this other, this man, and this place called Auschwitz.
Near the opening o f his essay "Enigma and Phenomenon," 
Levinas writes that the encounter with the Other is an "irreducible 
disturbance," a disturbance that cannot be reduced to an order. 
Nevertheless, Levinas tells us, "The Other can...not appear without 
renouncing his radical alterity, without entering into an o r d e r . " T o  
appear is to participate in being, to enter into the openness o f being, 
and thus to enter into the order o f ontology. Thus, the Other as 
phenomenon, as he appears in being, loses all alterity.
* Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation,  trans. by Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: 
University o f  Minnesota Press, 1993) 43
 ̂ Levinas, “Essence and D isinterestedness,” from Basic Philosophical Writings, 
ed. by Peperzak et al., trans. by Alphonso Lingis, 112.
10 Levinas, “Enigma and Phenomenon,” from Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. 
by Peperzak et al., trans. by Alphonso Lingis, 67.
11 Ibid., 68.
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It is on these terms, too, that we must consider the temporality 
o f this encounter. What would it mean to encounter the Other in the 
present? It would be precisely the neutralization o f the Other, the 
reduction o f alterity to the order o f the same. To be encountered in 
the present is to participate in being, in the flow o f  time. The 
"irreducible disturbance," the encounter o f the Other, cannot be 
reduced to the continuous flow  o f  time or the participation in 
ontology because it would be subordinated in both instances to 
horizonal being. Rather, it must occur in some other time, an-other 
time in which the present o f  the Other is nevertheless this non­
present. "[T]he past o f the Other must never have been p r e s e n t . ” ^^
A ll o f  which means that the encounter must occur in an 
immemorial past. Intentionality, as phenomenology has envisaged it 
since Brentano, is always consciousness o f  something. But this 
"consciousness of" is an enclosing, encapsulating consciousness, 
always participating in being and the present. The encounter with 
the Other is never encapsulated, cannot be, and thus, cannot be an 
encounter within horizonal being, even if  that horizon is the horizon 
o f continuous time. Moreover, this encounter cannot be experienced 
by a subject as we normally think o f one, for this would be the 
experiencing o f the Other in ecstatic consciousness and thus in a 
present. The encounter with the Other overwhelms subjectivity and 
always occurs in an immemorial past. Thus, as opposed to the 
phenomenal, Levinas says, the way the Other has o f "manifesting 
him self without manifesting himself, we call e n i g m a . ” ' ^
12 I b i d . ,  7 2 .
13 I b i d . ,  7 0 .
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Levi's curse, which is the demand to face this horror we call 
Auschwitz, would be enigmatic in a similar way. The curse is saying, 
addressing the Other, and as Levinas says, "All speaking is an 
e n i g m a . L e v i ' s  fore-word is the call that demands we turn our 
faces toward this other, both Levi and the Shoah, the man himself 
and the place called Auschwitz. But this saying is enigmatic, it is 
preoriginal, for it calls us to face the Other anterior to, in this 
immemorial past, the order o f  the same. "Being excludes all alterity. 
It can leave nothing outside and cannot remain outside, cannot let 
itse lf be ignored.”* ̂  The enigma, which would be the "irreducible 
disturbance" o f Being, is the "proximity o f  the Other as Other," the 
approach o f the Other. Levi's curse calls us to face this Other, it is 
the aperture o f his testimony. The opening o f the Other. Consider if  
this is a man: consider this man, this Other. ..
Levi demands that we turn toward this Other, this testimony. 
We are asked to consider, to look into the eyes o f  the man in the 
mud, fighting for scraps o f bread. This demand: what is it if  not a 
call toward responsibility? A demand that we respond, and more, 
that we respond for this Other? But, as we have said earlier, the 
encounter with the Other does not leave the subject in its power, its 
mastery; in fact, the responsibility we have toward the Other, 
revealed in the encounter, is rooted in the destitution o f the subject.
14 Ibid., 73
15 Ibid., 74.
16 Ibid., 74.
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"[T]he I," Levinas writes, "is revealed as preeminently the 
same, is produced as a sojourn in the w o r l d . " T h e  subject, for 
Levinas, is produced through its interaction in the world. Hence, 
dwelling becomes the mode o f Levinas' conception o f subjectivity, 
since in dwelling we find the concreteness o f the same in an egoism. 
"Dwelling is the very mode o f maintaining onese lf  ..as the body that, 
on the earth exterior to it, holds i t s e l f  up and Having a home,
a site, produces identification; in the site I am provided the means to 
sustain myself. As Heidegger, who made the term famous, says, "To 
dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, 
the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its 
n a t u r e . A n d  this takes on a special meaning for human beings: 
"[HJuman being consists in dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the 
sense o f the stay o f  mortals on the earth.”2o The being o f the human 
is to dwell, to dwell on the earth, wherein that being is preserved. It 
is the same idea for Levinas, for in dwelling, the subject is sustained 
and preserved in its subjectivity.
The power o f subjectivity, its ability to sustain itself in 
dwelling, is thus an egoism. "The site, a medium, affords means," 
Levinas writes.^i The means for what? To sustain the 'I,' the subject 
o f  power and mastery. But, it is important to note, this subjectivity 
is identification in terms o f  dwelling, o f  a site, and not o f total
1̂  Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 37.
18 Ibid., 37.
19 Martin Heidegger, “Building D w elling Thinking,” from Poetry, Language, 
T hought,  trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York; Harper & Row, 1971) 149.
20 Ibid., 149.
21 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 37.
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coincidence with se lf (a formal identity) Which takes us to a further, 
more significant, point: the same and the other are not simply 
contradictory. This kind o f formal alterity "by virtue o f the common 
frontier...within the system, would yet be the same. ” 22 Formal 
alterity, the alterity o f the contradiction, would be subsumed 
beneath the systematic eye o f  the same, and would thus be 
contained. The encounter with the Other, then, is by no means 
m erely a contradiction, the encounter between mere opposites.
Rather, it is a call to responsibility.
"The epiphany o f the Absolutely Other is a face by which the 
Other challenges and commands me ”23 It is in the face to face, in the 
face o f the Other, that the Other is revealed. Here there is no 
reference to the horizon, but the surpassing o f all horizons. "What, 
then, is this encounter with the absolutely-other?" Jacques Derrida 
asks.
Neither representation, nor limitation, nor 
conceptual relation to the same. The ego and 
the other do not permit themselves to be 
dominated or made into totalities by a 
concept o f  relationship. And first of all 
because the concept..., which is always g iven  
to the other, cannot encompass the other, 
cannot include the other....24
Why? Why is the concept unable to encompass the other? Because
the Other remains an infinite distance from me, even in the closeness
22 Ibid., 39
23 Levinas, “Transcendence and Height,” from Basic Philosophical Writings, 
ed. by Peperzak et al., trans. by Tina Chanter, Nicholas Walker, and Simon 
Critchley, 17.
24 Jacques Derrida, “V iolence and M etaphysics,” from Writing and Difference, 
trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1978) 95.
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o f the face to face. In the bounds o f knowledge (and we here intend 
the full meaning o f the term ’bounds') the Other is subordinated to 
being, and thus to the same. Within the horizon of being, the Other is 
simply another existent, another being, and in no way free. But in 
the closeness o f the face to face, the Other exceeds all limitations, 
since to limit the Other, to subordinate the Other, would be to violate 
the absolutely other .25 Thus, in the relation o f the face to face, which 
is really no relation, the Other remains an infinite distance from me 
because he exceeds all limitations that my being would impose on 
him. "Face to face with the other within a glance and  a speech which 
both maintain distance and interrupt all totalities, this being- 
together as separation precedes or exceeds society, collectivity, 
com m unity.”26 It is this infinite distance that Levinas has in mind 
when he says that our relation with the Other is one o f height.
The encounter with the Other, then, is an encounter with the 
infinite, an encounter which cannot be reduced to the order of the 
same. This is the relation o f the "third kind" that Blanchot speaks of, 
the non-symmetrical relation. What founds this relation, Blanchot 
writes, is "no longer proximity—proximity o f struggle, o f services, o f  
essence, o f knowledge, or o f  recognition, not even o f solitude—but 
rather the s t ra n g e n e s s  between us; a strangeness it will not suffice to 
characterize as a separation or even as a distance.”22 This is the 
revelation o f the face as Levinas discusses it, the horizon-less 
encounter. Indeed, Blanchot calls this relation "Man without horizon"
25 Cf. Derrida, 95
26 Ibid., 95.
2"̂ Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation,  68.
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because it is the pure encounter o f man "not affirming him self on the 
basis o f  a h o r i z o n . The pure exigency o f the face.
The e x ig e n c y  o f  the face. As we said earlier, the face of the 
Other challenges and commands me. How so? Because the encounter 
with the Other puts me into question. "Instead o f seizing the Other 
through comprehension...the I loses its hold before the absolutely 
Other, before the human Other, and, unjustified, can no longer be 
p o w e r f u l . T h e  face o f the Other rips a breach in the totality of the 
same, puts the totality in question. Before the absolutely other the T'
o f subjectivity comes into question. The face, the other, is that which
cannot be totalized, thus putting my power in question.
Blanchot makes the point o f  the encounter occurring without 
horizon, since the horizon would only again bring the Other back 
under the theme o f  the same. Derrida emphasizes this point. "The 
other...is given 'in person' and without allegory only in the face," and 
further, "The face is not a metaphor, not a f i g u r e . The face to face 
is a pure encounter, without recourse. Here, I am in immediate 
proximity to the Other, even while there exists an infinite distance 
between us. I am here stripped o f all power.
In the face, the other is given over in person 
as other, that is, as that which does not reveal
itself, as that which cannot be made thematic.
I could not possibly speak o f  the Other, make 
o f the Other a theme, pronounce the Other as 
object, in the accusative. I can only, I m ust
only speak to the other; that is, I must call
28 Ibid., 69.
29 Levinas, “Transcendence and Height,” 17.
30 Derrida, 100-01.
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him in the vocative, which is not a category, a 
case o f speech, but, rather the bursting forth,
the very raising up o f  speech  Always
behind its signs and its works, always within 
its secret interior, and forever discreet, 
interrupting all historical totalities through its 
freedom o f speech, the face is not "of this 
world." It is the origin o f the world. 1 can 
speak o f  it only by speaking to it.....
The face cannot be thematized, cannot be woven into the totality of
the same without thereby neutralizing alterity. Hence, to speak o f it,
as Derrida says, 1 must speak to it. The face calls me out to respond.
It demands my speaking to it. As Blanchot says, "Speech affirms the
abyss that there is between 'm yself and 'autrui,' and it passes over
the impassable, but without abolishing or reducing it.”32 To speak to
the Other is to approach the Other without neutralizing him.
It is thus, from the infinite height o f the Other, that the face 
commands and challenges me. It in no way signifies anything, but 
rather commands a response. It is thus that Blanchot will say, "man 
facing man... has no choice but to speak or to kill.”33 I cannot face the 
Other and not respond, whether that response be murder, since 
murder is but the hate o f the demand the face makes upon me, the 
violence o f  the same in its breached totality, unwilling to sacrifice 
itself for the Other. Speech, saying, the engimatic, nonphenomenal, 
unrepresentable, and thus, always immemorial, approach that 
nevertheless is both close and infinitely distant, is the authentic
31 Ibid., 103.
32 Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation,  63
33 Ibid., 61.
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response. The encounter with the Other occurs in this dangerous, 
im possible landscape.
B. Welcoming the Other. Jewish humanism
Blanchot has sought in Judaism the affirmation o f  exile and 
nomadism, the affirmation o f  distance and proximity. Considered a 
negative condition, even an affliction, by many, Blanchot sees in 
Judaism the "foundation o f our relationship to others"—a 
fundamentally ethical conception.34 Nomadism, a perpetual 
relationship with exteriority, with alterity and the Other, becomes 
the basis for ethics. In Judaism Blanchot finds an other humanism.
Blanchot contrasts Jewish nomadism with paganism. "To be 
pagan," he tells us, "is to be fixed, to plant oneself in the earth, as it 
were, to establish oneself through a pact with the permanence that 
authorizes sojourn and is certified by the certainty in the land.’’̂  ̂
Paganism, riveted to a site, is ultimately power, for it is the site 
where the pagan dwells, that, as both Heidegger and Levinas tell us, 
preserves the freedom o f the human being and provides him with 
m ean s.36 Paganism is rooted in power and thus allows subjectivity to 
flourish.
Nomadism, on the other hand, "answers to a relation that 
possession cannot satisfy."^? Where paganism is rooted to the site.
3'* Blanchot, “Do Not Forget,” 245.
35 Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” from The Blanchot Reader,  ed. by Michael 
Holland, trans. by Susan Hanson, 230
36 Cf. the preceding section.
3̂  Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” 230.
14
the site o f power and possibility, nomadism answers to a different 
relation, a relation o f difference. Nomadism is a relation with exile 
and exodus, with leaving the homeland, with never having a proper 
homeland. "To leave the homeland, yes; to come and go in such a 
way as to affirm the world as a passage.... The words exodus and 
exile indicate a positive relation with exteriority, whose exigency 
invites us not to be content with what is proper to us.” *̂ What is 
proper to us in this sense? Paganism, ”[0]ur power to assimilate 
everything, to identify everything, to bring everything back to our 
I.”39 Nomadism, on the other hand, is the affirmation of the 
exteriority o f  the world, o f exteriority itself.'*®
38 Ibid., 232.
39 Ibid., 232.
An interesting connection to the work o f  Gilles Deleuze has done on 
N ietzsche’s thought reveals itse lf  here in Blanchot’s discussion o f  nomadism. 
For Deleuze, N ietzsche has opened a new political possibility, and that 
possibility is essentially nomadic. He writes, “Philosophic discourse is born 
out o f  the imperial state, and it passes through innumerable metamorphoses, 
the same metamorphoses that lead us from the foundations o f empire to the 
Greek city. Even within the Greek city-state, philosophic discourse remained 
in strict relation with the despot (or at least within the shadow o f despotism), 
with imperialism ... But i f  Nietzsche does not belong to philosophy, it is
perhaps because he was the first to conceive o f  another kind o f discourse as
counter-philosophy. This discourse is above all nomadic [and] its 
statem ents...[are] not the utterances o f  a rational, administrative machinery, 
whose philosophers would be bureaucrats o f  pure reason...” A thought from 
the Outside, as Blanchot might put it. The break with totality, for both Deleuze 
and Blanchot, is nomadic. But the comparison runs deeper, for both thinkers 
see in this break a kind o f  politics o f  the Outside. Deleuze writes, “We also 
know that the problem for revolutionaries today is to unite within the purpose 
o f the particular struggle without falling into the despotic and bureaucratic 
organization o f  the party or state apparatus. We seek...a nomadic unit related 
to the outside that w ill not revive an internal despotic unity.” Nomadism as the 
perpetual break with totalities. And Blanchot writes, “ [AJffirm the break ...
The break with the powers that be, hence with the notion o f  power, hence
everywhere that power predominates.” Nomadism as the root o f a politics o f
the outside, a politics that does not reconstruct itself as a state apparatus, but, 
rather, always fires at despotism from the outside, always de-constructs itself.
A discussion o f  nomadism should not overlook this kind o f  political possibility. 
Cf. Gilles Deleuze, “Nomad Thought,” from The New Nietzsche, ed. and trans. by
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Nomadism thus puts the site in question; it always refers to a 
beyond. "Exodus and exile," Blanchot tells us, "express simply the 
same reference to the Outside that the word existence bears.
Beyond being, outside being: existence is the ecstasy o f existence.
"[I]f to become rooted in a culture and in a regard for things does not 
suffice," Blanchot propbses:
it is because the order o f  the realities in 
which we become rooted does not hold the 
key to all the relations to which we must 
respond. [In opposition to the pagan order o f  
things and truth], there is another dimension 
revealed to man where, beyond every 
horizon, he must relate to what is beyond his 
reach. 42
Nomadism is the putting into question o f  the pagan site, and thus 
opens us to another dimension. But this dimension is "beyond every 
horizon," that is, it occurs within no horizon. What are these relations 
that exceed the pagan horizon? They are our relations with others.
For Blanchot, being Jewish means much more than the negative 
conditions o f suffering and persecution. It is an "exigency o f  
strangeness," the demand to bear out the stranger.43 As Edmond 
Jabes says, "Jewish solidarity is the impossible passion one stranger 
can feel for another.”44 The Jew has always been the stranger, the
David B. A llison (Cambridge, Massachusettes: The MIT Press, 1985), and 
Blanchot, “Disorderly W ords,” from The Blanchot Reader, ed. and trans. by 
M ichael Holland (Cambridge, M assachusettes: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1995).
41 Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” 232.
42 Ibid., 232-3.
43 Ibid., 234.
44 Edmond Jabes, The Book o f  Yukel, trans. by Rosmarie Waldrop (Middletown, 
Connecticut: W esleyan University Press, 1985) 32.
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nomad, and thus it should be no surprise that Blanchot finds the Jew 
to be the aperture to this relation. The other humanism Blanchot 
proposes rests on the encounter with the Other, the encounter that 
Jewish nomadism and being Jewish opens.
What, Blanchot asks, is the gift o f Israel? The teaching o f the 
one God. But this is not the heart o f what Judaism has taught, 
Blanchot says. Rather, he responds, "[W]hat we owe to Jewish 
monotheism is not the revelation o f  the one God, but the revelation 
o f speech as the place where men hold themselves in relation with 
what excludes all relation: the Infinitely Distant, the absolutely 
Foreign. God speaks, and man speaks to him.”'̂  ̂ For Blanchot, the 
heart o f  this humanism, o f  this Jewish humanism (as opposed to 
Greek or pagan humanism), is speech as the impossible relation. The 
impossible relation because it brings us into relation with what is 
infinitely distant, which "excludes all relation."'*^ The communion 
with God, and ultimately, the community o f Jews, is sustained in 
speech, which does not reduce distance but rather sustains it while 
nevertheless bringing us into relations.
"Distance," Blanchot tells us, "is not abolished, it is not even 
diminished; on the contrary, it is maintained, preserved in its purity 
by the rigour o f the speech that upholds the absoluteness of 
d i f f e r e n c e . " 4 7  Speech is the mode o f proximity, that is, in speech, 
what is proximal is preserved in its distance without being 
appropriated or assimilated. It is addressing what is different
45 Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” 233.
46 Ibid., 233
47 Ibid., 233.
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without reducing that difference. Speech and address are preserves 
o f distance.
Let us acknowledge that Jewish thought does 
not know, or refuses, mediation and speech as 
mediating. But its importance is precisely in 
teaching us that speaking inaugurates an 
original relation in which the terms involved 
do not have to atone for this relation or 
disavow themselves in favour o f a measure 
supposed to be common; they rather ask and 
are accorded reception precisely by reason o f  
that which they do not have in common.^»
In speaking, the Other is preserved and not reduced to a totality.
The address addresses the Other, it is not a speech o f power but a
mode o f  address, o f calling toward. "To speak to someone is to accept
not introducing him into the system o f things or o f beings to be
known," Blanchot says. Rather, "[l]t is to recognize him as unknown
and to receive him as foreign without obliging him to break with his
d ifferen ce .”49 Thus, even this preservation is poorly named if  we
assume by it a measure o f  power in the addressee; it is not the
power o f  preservation, but the w e lc o m in g  o f the Other in all his
o th ern ess.
Thus, nomadism and speech would be a kind o f welcoming and 
receiving. Speech welcomes the Other in all his otherness, and 
nomadism affirms this relation with exteriority. When Levinas tells 
us that our relation with the Other is one o f height, of infinite 
distance, Blanchot reads this, correctly, as a relation with the infinite, 
and speech sustains this relation. The Other (is) an enigma in
48 Ibid., 233
49 Ibid., 233.
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Levinas' sense o f the term, that is, the Other disrupts being and
ontology. As such, the Other is infinitely distant from me, and it is
with this infinite distance that I am now in relation. Judaism, for
Blanchot, has always recognized this infinity, has always been in this
relation because o f its monotheism. Nomadism, thus, is the 
affirmation o f this relation, and speech is its landscape. "Speech," 
Blanchot tells us, "is the promised land where exile fulfills itself in 
sojourn since it is not a matter o f being at home there but o f being 
always Outside, engaged in a movement wherein the Foreign offers 
itself, yet without disavowing itself.
Thus, Blanchot proposes a "Jewish humanism," which is to be 
distinguished from Greek humanism "by a concern with human 
relations so preponderant that, even when God is nominally present, 
it is still a question o f  man; o f what there is between man and man 
when nothing brings them together or separates them but 
th e m se lv e s .”5* The God o f Israel, the monotheism o f the Jews, opens 
onto the distance between human beings, but in such a fashion as to 
welcom e what is distant, to welcome the Other in his destitution and 
destruction. Greek humanism, the humanism o f ontology, neutralizes 
alterity, and thus the Other is never welcome unless cloaked and 
reduced to the order o f the same. But in Jewish humanism the Other 
is welcomed in his otherness, addressed in speech, affirmed in his 
difference. It is thus that Blanchot says:
Jews are not different from other men in the
way racism would have us believe; they
50 Ibid., 233.
51 Ibid., 233-4,
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rather bear witness, as Levinas says, to this 
relation with difference that the human 
face...reveals to us and entrusts to our 
responsibility; not strangers, but recalling us 
to the exigency o f strangeness; not separated 
by an incomprehensible retribution, but 
designating as pure separation and as pure 
relation what, from man to man, exceeds 
human power—which is nonetheless capable 
o f  anything.52
And as Edmond Jabes says, "The salvation o f the Jewish people lies in 
severance, in solidarity at the heart o f s e v e r a n c e . " 5 3
Levi's curse opens this aperture, demands that it be faced, that 
we take our place and assume our responsibility. To face the Shoah, 
to approach the suffering o f  Others, to enter into this community 
bound by nomadism: these are Levi's demands. Nomadism means to 
leave behind what we know and possess, to forget the land where it 
is safe and warm and to turn toward the exterior, toward what is 
other. Levi's curse calls us to face the horror, to look at this man 
fighting for scraps, and to recognize that we are bound to him.
52 Ibid., 234.
53 Edmond Jabes, The Book o f  Questions, trans. by Rosmarie Waldrop 
(M iddletown, Connecticut: W esleyan University Press, 1972) 100.
Chapter 2
A. Event without horizon
Levi’s curse calls us to face his testimony, to face the 
destruction o f human beings at Auschwitz. It is the fore-word, in the 
preoriginal sense Levinas gives to the term, becuase it calls us 
toward the word o f  the Other. Levi's demand is the demand to 
encounter the other, to encounter the horrible, to encounter 
Auschwitz. The ceaseless appeal o f Auschwitz is realized in the 
curse. It draws us into the impossible proximity o f one to the other.
This proximity, as we have seen in Levinas' study of the face to 
face, is an ab-solute encounter, since it occurs anterior to any horizon 
and without mediation: it is pure encounter. It is absolute in the 
sense o f  non-solubility. Thus, when Blanchot tells us that the Shoah 
is "the absolute event o f  history," he has this meaning in mind: the 
Shoah is not soluble, is not r e d u c i b l e . 4̂ Auschwitz cannot be reduced 
to a sensible moment on a familiar continuum, calculable, say, in a 
causal series. It is itse lf the horizon, which is subordinated to no 
other.
This theme recurs in Shoah testimony. Inmates found 
them selves unable to transcend their reality toward some other. The 
entire horizon became day-to-day survival, and envisioning life 
beyond it became impossible. The reality o f  the camp was total, an 
impenetrable wall. Certainly, there was the hope o f freedom, of
54 Blanchot, The W riting o f  the D isaster, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln, 
Nebraska: University o f  Nebraska Press, 1995) 47.
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liberation and a return to homes and families, but in no way did
these hopes sustain the inmates. And further, these hopes most
often took the form o f desires felt most intensely within the camp. 
Hence, inmates relate that they dreamed almost nightly o f large
meals and warm baths, even cigarettes and coffee. But for the
majority o f the inmates; what Levi calls the "backbone o f the camp," 
there was nothing beyond immediate hunger and pain.
[T]hey, the Muselmanner, the drowned...an
anonymous mass, continually renewed and
always identical, o f  non-men who march and 
labour in silence, the divine spark dead 
within them, already too empty to really 
suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one
hesitates to call their death death, in the face
o f which they have no fear, as they are too 
tired to understand.^^
The drowned, as Levi calls them, are unable to fear even their own 
death; for them there is only the immediacy of existence: hunger, 
pain, affliction.
Jean Amery, though in no way a Muselmann, nevertheless 
relates a similar experience. Returning from work one evening, 
Amery's attention is caught by a flag waving in the wind in front of a 
building. ‘“ The walls stand speechless and cold, the flags clank in the 
wind,’ I muttered to m yself in mechanical association,” Amery 
w r i t e  s . 56 Amery remembers how the stanza used to affect him.
Then I repeated the stanza somewhat louder, 
listened to the words sound, tried to track the
56 Levi, Survival in Auschw itz, 90.
56 Jean Amery, “At the M ind’s Limits,” from At the M in d ’s Lim its, trans; by 
Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (New York: Schocken Books, 1986) 7
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rhythm, and expected that the emotional and 
mental response that for years this Holderlin 
poem had awakened in me would emerge.
But nothing happened. The poem no longer 
transcended reality. There it was and all that 
remained was objective statement: such and 
such, and the Kapo roars "left," and the soup 
was watery, and the flags are clanking in the 
wind.57
For Amery, there is no longer a transcendence in the line, only the 
the camp itself. Yes, the flag clanks in the wind, here, in Auschwitz.
It does not lift him beyond the walls o f the camp, but somehow is 
exhausted in the camp itself.
Auschwitz became, in this sense, a kind o f unsurpassable 
horizon. It was not merely a place, but a world, and a totalized world 
at that. The Holderlin line is deflated completely in the camp. 
Charlotte Delbo, too, discusses this point. She writes, "When I would 
recite a poem [Delbo was known in the camp for her literary 
background, and much loved because o f it], when I would tell the 
comrades beside me what a novel or a play was about while we went 
on digging in the muck o f  the swamp, it was to keep m yself alive ...to 
remain me, to make sure o f it. Never did that succeed in nullifying 
the moment I was living through, not for an instant.” »̂ Here, as for 
Amery, there is no aesthetic transcendence, not even momentary 
conciliation. "Reality was right there, killing. There was no possible 
getting away from it.”^̂  These moments are what we might call
57 Ibid., 7.
5* Charlotte Delbo, D ays and M em ory, trans. by Rosette Lamont (Marlboro, 
Vermont; The Marlboro Press, 1990) 2.
59 Ibid., 2.
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anarchie, since they neither stem from the reality they arise in nor 
do they dissolve into it; they arise as moments o f  an-archic defiance.
Delbo asks herself i f  she is "living with Auschwitz?" She 
responds, "No, I live next to it. Auschwitz is there, unalterable, 
precise...."^0 "I live within a twofold being. The Auschwitz double 
doesn't bother me.... As though it weren't I at all. Without this split 
I would not have been able to r e v i v e . F o r  Delbo, her being has 
been split in two so that she might return to so-called "ordinary" life. 
But, as she says, Auschwitz remains, it is "there, unalterable, precise." 
It remains totally isolated from the rest o f her life, a horizon so 
impenetrable that she had to split in order to continue on.
It is thus that Auschwitz was its own horizon. The event 
Auschwitz, the Shoah, as for these survivors, remains an 
impenetrable wall, indissoluble. The experience remains hard, in 
memory. To have lived through the camps, for Delbo, meant the 
necessity to split into two different beings. It was impossible to 
place the event within another horizon; to do so would be to 
subordinate the ultimate to the everyday, to the common. And this 
tendency is a constant struggle in testimony, a struggle against the 
audience's tendency to reduce, to identify, and to accept.
In her first memoir o f the camps. None o f  Us Will Return, Delbo 
attempts to confine this trend by addressing the audience outright. 
While narrating aspects of life in the camps, she also explores the 
limits o f the reader's ability to understand, even to hear, her words. 
A dangerous fault line opens between narrative and knowledge,
60 Ibid., 2.
61 Ibid., 3.
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between words and understanding; a space begins to develop which 
the reader both occupies and cannot occupy.
"O you who know," Delbo writes, "did you k n o w . . . . ” ^2 q  you who 
know, O reader who knows...who thinks he knows...who thinks it is 
possible to know: these are Delbo's accusations, cloaked as questions. 
O f course, we do not know. The knowledge Delbo possesses, useless 
knowledge, as she calls it, is an immediate knowledge, a burning or a 
scarring, not textbook knowledge. "O you who know" means nothing 
more than you don't know, couldn't possibly know. And yet she asks 
us to know, to attempt to understand.
Delbo strives in her narrative to exteriorize the knowledge she 
is communicating. Writing in vignettes, as so many survivors do, 
Delbo often punctuates and interrupts her narratives by somehow  
disrupting the reader. At one point in her memoir she relates the 
story o f  a woman who, driven by thirst, breaks ranks and runs for 
water. Delbo, paradoxically, weaves a beautiful prose poem that 
roams over the "white plain" while still relating the terrifying events 
leading to the woman's death. Near the middle o f  the vignette, 
however, Delbo abruptly interrupts her narrative to tell us 
"Presently I am writing this story in a cafe—it is turning into a 
s t o r y . ” ^ 3  Delbo exteriorizes the narrative by temporally displacing 
both herself, as narrator, and the reader: we are suddenly pulled out 
o f the text and into a Parisian cafe The first person plural, the most 
common voice in Shoah memoirs, suddenly flees beyond the horizon.
Charlotte Delbo, None o f  Us W ill Return, from Auschw itz and After, trans. by 
Rosette C Lamont (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) 11.
63 Ibid., 26.
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'We' is ever so far over there. She ends the vignette by writing, "And 
now I am sitting in a cafe, writing this text.” "̂*
The most profound example o f this exteriorization, though, 
comes late in the text. While digging one day, two o f  Delbo's friends 
die. After carrying the bodies back to the camp, the women stand at 
roll call. "Throughout the roll call, we never looked at them. A 
corpse. The left eye devoured by a rat. The other open with its 
fringe o f  lashes." But here she pauses, and then writes, "Try to look. 
Just try and see.”^̂  She addresses the reader explicitly, challenging 
the reader to "try to see " The event that she has just narrated she 
now banishes from the reader: you cannot see this, you cannot 
understand this. She openly questions the ability o f the reader to
grasp this event. In her challenge lies the exteriorization o f  the 
event, it puts the entire narrative in question. Delbo works to 
maintain the singularity o f  the event by exteriorizing her narrations 
with regard to the reader. She tells her story and then declares that 
it cannot be understood. While narrating her experiences, she is also 
revealing the problematics o f  testimony and bearing witness, 
attempting to open a space in which the reader might, rather than 
attempting to integrate the Shoah into historical consciousness, 
recognize this new catastrophe. It is as i f  Delbo's real subject is not 
her experience o f  life in Auschwitz but, rather, the question of  
bearing witness to that experience.
Delbo recognizes a central problem in testimony: while the 
event, for the survivor, remains a singular one (it is a horizon unto
64 Ibid., 29
65 Ibid., 84
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itself), the audience imm ediately contextualizes and appropriates the 
testimony, drawing inferences and conclusions. The irreducible is 
reduced, placed within a horizon, mediated. But this is not an act of 
aggression on the part o f the audience, that is to say, the audience is 
here not to be held strictly accountable for this p h en o m en o n .  And 
this is precisely the point, the tes t i fy ing  becomes tes t imony,  becomes 
phenomenal. As Levinas says, the "subordination of the saying to the 
said, to the linguistic system and to ontology, is the price that 
m anifestation d e m a n d s . T h a t  for every speaking there is a said, a 
content, is the price for that speaking. It manifests itself, and as 
such, is reduced to the order o f the same "In language qua said, 
everything is translated before us, be it at the price of a betrayal.”®̂
This betrayal is Delbo's theme, we may even say, nemesis, 
through much o f  her writing. The attempt to exteriorize her 
narratives is an attempt to fend o ff this betrayal. The reader is left 
with testimony with which in no way is he or she comfortable, even 
beyond the sheer horror o f the content. The position o f the reader is 
complicated, thematized and put into question. It stands and falls on 
the approach to the work, on the wholeness o f the work and the 
work’s "unto itself-ness."
Thus, we come back to Blanchot's complicated phrase, "the 
h o lo c a u s t—the absolute event o f  his tory . . . . The Shoah, this 
horizon-less event, nevertheless occurs within history, the totalizing
Levinas, “Essence and D isinterestedness,” 112.
67 Ibid., 112.
68 Blanchot, The Writing o f  the D isaster, 47.
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horizon. We thus have histories, studies, graphs, figures, statistics: all 
to relate the immensity o f the destruction, how it took place, who 
perpetrated it, and its roots in past historical trends. And all, also, to 
place the event within larger contexts, to provide horizons o f  
meaning in order to understand But survivors continually struggle 
against this contextualizing, against any subordination o f the Shoah 
to a theme. As Lawrence L. Langer notes, survivors often feel their 
descriptions o f  life in the camps are "totally inadequate" and cannot 
"convey the enormity o f  the event.”^̂  Here, as Delbo knows, there is 
a sense o f betrayal.
But this betrayal is the price o f the Shoah's phenomenality. It 
occurred: this fact returns again and again. The Shoah was a moment 
in history, and yet it is the encounter with the ultimate, the singular. 
If  God, as Levinas says, cannot be encountered within the world, the 
Shoah would be the opposite. Total affliction, immediate pain, living 
hunger: the creation o f  the society o f the Musselmanner, a society 
without horizon, living in the non-present presence o f  pain and 
hunger. Ab-solute: referring to no horizon, irreducible.
It is thus that bearing witness has come to signify Shoah 
testimony. The inscription over the entrance to the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, in the words of Elie W iesel, reads, "For 
the the dead a n d  the living, we must bear witness." The survivor 
feels a responsibility to be heard, to tell what happened. To tell the 
story, as if  nothing else could be done, no explaining and no 
balancing o f the accounts.
Lawrence L. Langer, H olocau st Testim onies  (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991) 61.
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B. Suffering
The Shoah is an event without horizon. The words o f Jean 
Amery and Charlotte Delbo, and the society o f the Muselmanner, 
testify to this. The inability to transcend, to overcome, the camp, the 
hunger, the pain, all indicate that the universe o f  the camp was one 
unto itself, a domain that was self-enclosed. Marked by a burning 
immediacy, the suffering at the heart o f the Shoah nullified all 
horizons.
Horizons are the source o f continuity. Phenomenology has 
always understood this, that is, has always understood that any 
understanding occurs against the horizon. Indeed, we can make a 
plea to the German language to make this point clear. 'Object,' in 
German, is 'gegenstand,' literally, to 'stand against.' Thus, an object is 
always understood agains t  the horizon beyond it. As Heidegger says, 
"A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks 
recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its 
p re se n c in g .  That is why the concept is that o f hor ism os ,  that is, the 
horizon...."̂ 0 It is only against the horizon that presence is 
encountered .
But this recognizing o f  presence is a mode o f power. Levinas 
writes; "An existent is comprehended in the measure that thought 
transcends it, measuring it against the horizon whereupon it is 
p r o f i l e d . T h e  horizon, the against-which, allows for the 
comprehension, the apprehension, o f  the existent. It affords a
H eidegger, “Building D w elling Thinking,” 154 
Levinas, T otality  and Infinity, 44.
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medium wherein the thing can be comprehended. Thus, the horizon 
allows for power. It allows the comprehension o f  the thing, the 
existent, because it determines the parameters o f the encounter.
When Levinas says (with Heidegger), "Being is inseparable from the 
comprehension o f  Being," he implies this relation o f p o w e r .^2 The 
existent is neutralized in the encounter, and the horizon allows for 
this neutralization. Thus, the horizon, for Heideggerian 
phenomenology, works to contextualize the existent.
"Suffering," Blanchot writes:
is suffering when one can no longer suffer it, 
and when, because o f  this non-power, one 
cannot cease suffering it. A singular situation.
Time is as though arrested, merged with its 
interval. There, the present is without end, 
separated from every other present by an 
inexhaustible and empty infinite, the very 
infinite o f suffering, and thus dispossessed o f  
any future; a present without end and yet 
impossible as a present^]
This suffering occurs without horizon. In torture, the victim's
suffering is measured, gauged, in order to keep the victim there, that
is, in order to m ain ta in  the victim through  the suffering so that
information might be forced out o f him. Torture is thus a suffering
which occurs within a horizon: a measured, calculated suffering. But
the suffering Blanchot describes has already passed over into
another time. It is the suffering o f the Muselmanner, the drowned,
the anonymous mass that forms the "backbone o f  the camp." Broken,
annihilated: the Muselmanner are  this suffering. As Levi says, "One
72 Ibid., 45.
73 Blanchot, The Infinite C on versa tion , 44.
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hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call their death 
d e a t h . . . . " 7 4  They are stripped o f  all identity and power, even the 
power to suffer, to un dergo  their suffering.
"The present o f  suffering," Blanchot tells us, "is the abyss of the 
present, indefinitely hollowed out and in this hollowing indefinitely 
distended, radically alien to the possibility that one might be present 
to it through the mastery o f  p r e s e n c e . ” 7 5  In suffering, the present o f  
suffering nullifies any horizon. Indeed, i f  the horizon is the source of  
power, against which one can cornprehend,  then the present of  
suffering has no such horizon. The Muselmanner, unable to 
appropriate their suffering as their own, slip into anonymity.
Stripped o f their identity, stripped by suffering, they are turned over 
to another time, this present without presence, a present without 
horizon, wherein there is only suffering. When Levi says that the 
Muselmanner "are already too empty to really suffer," Blanchot 
would agree.76 He writes, suffering "is a question not o f that 
paroxysmic state where the se lf cries out and is torn apart, but 
rather o f a suffering that is almost indifferent, not suffered, but 
neutral (a phantom o f  suffering) insofar as the one who is exposed to 
it, precisely through this suffering, is deprived o f the T  that would 
make him suffer it [my e m p h a s e s ] . ”77 It is the suffering through 
which the self, subjectivity, etc., cannot be sustained. It is "not...the
74 Levi, Survival in Auschw itz, 90.
75 Blanchot, The Infinite C onversation , 44.
76 Levi, Survival in Auschw itz, 90.
77 Blanchot, The Infinite C onversation , 44-5.
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trial o f experience, but rather that trial from which we can no longer 
escape.”'̂ *
This suffering cannot be escaped. It is the experience of 
strangeness, o f  alterity. The horizon provides distance, a 
background, against which we can comprehend the existent. In 
horrified fascination the existent overwhelms the subject and the 
horizon. But in suffering, the horizon is nullified not by an existent, 
but rather through the experience from which no distance can be 
taken. The horizon, for subjectivity, would allow some distance 
wherein the appropriation o f  suffering could occur, but here "it is so 
close that we are prohibited from taking any distance from it—it is 
foreign in its very proximity.”'̂  ̂ As Blanchot says, we have a word 
for this, a word that designates this proximity; immediacy. ”[T]he 
immediate that allows no mediation, the absence o f  separation that is 
absence o f  relation as well as infinite separation because this 
separation does not reserve for us the distance and the future we 
need in order to be able to relate ourselves to it, to come about in 
it.”8° This suffering is burning immediacy.
In nullifying the horizon, suffering, the suffering o f the 
Muselmanner (but also the suffering that is, in an important sense, 
the Shoah) disrupts all contextualization and continuity. As Blanchot 
says, suffering takes away our ability to relate to ourselves through 
the future, thus cutting off any sense o f  continuity. Suffering occurs 
within a non-present present, the present o f proximity to the
78 Ibid., 45
79 Ibid., 45.
80 Ibid., 45.
3 2
strange, and thus can never be fully recuperated or brought back 
into a continuum that would make sense o f it all. It is an 
immemorial past, a disturbance in the order of things. It is pure in 
its immediacy.
Thus, when Blanchot says, "He who has been the contemporary 
of the camps is forever a survivor: death will not make him die," we 
must recognize the interminability o f the Shoah.^' For survivors, 
even (for Blanchot) for contemporaries o f  the camps, the mode of  
surviving is not one that can be overcome. This suffering cannot be 
transcended. It can be broken, much like a trance can be broken, but 
it cannot be appropriated. It is suffering without end, an 
interminable presence, a presence, as he says, that is distended. This 
suffering cannot be overcome by power, cannot be contextualized or 
wrought to fit into a continuum. It persists, like the il y  a, always 
working and un-working beneath projects, always nullifying the 
horizon.
The Shoah continues to destroy. We must learn this. Its horror 
persists. To date the end o f the destruction with the "liberation" o f  
the camps is foolish and assuming. In an effort to combat this false 
conclusion, Levi writes:
In the majority o f  the cases, the hour of 
liberation was neither joyful nor lighthearted.
For most it occurred against a tragic 
background o f destruction, slaughter, and 
suffering. Just as they felt they were again 
becoming men, that is, responsible, the 
sorrows o f men returned: the sorrow o f the
Blanchot, The W riting o f  the D isaster, 143
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dispersed or lost family; the universal 
suffering all around; their own exhaustion, 
which seemed definitive, past cure; the
problems o f a life to begin all over again amid
the rubble, often alone. Not "pleasure the son 
o f  misery," but misery the son o f m i s e r y . * 2
For Levi, the "liberation" may not be aptly named i f  it intends a
sense o f  the end o f  the Shoah. Suffering continued, and Levi's essay
is about a kind o f  suffering that persisted long after the rubble had
been cleared and people had either returned to their home or built a
new one the suffering o f  shame. The moment the SS left Auschwitz,
when the dogs were removed, when the Russians arrived, when one
found one's home again: not one o f these moments marks the end of
this suffering. It persists.
The suffering that is the Shoah cannot be transcended, cannot 
be appropriated. It occurs without horizon, outside contextualization 
and continuity. But what does this really mean? That the Shoah, 
while a date in history, a date that can be marked and pointed to, is 
also outside history. Outside history? Outside the narrative that is 
history, the appropriation that is history. The continuity embodied 
in history, the power that is history, cannot appropriate the Shoah. 
Suffering is always immemorial, always already past, and thus, 
cannot enter into discourse.
Suffering, Blanchot tells us, delivers us "over to another time— 
to time as other, as absence and neutrality; precisely to a time that
*2 Levi, “Shame,” from The D row ned and The Saved, trans. by Raymond 
Rosenthal (New York; Vintage International, 1989) 70-1.
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can no longer redeem us, that constitutes no recourse.”*̂  What would 
this redemption be, i f  it were possible? The contextualization o f  
suffering, suffering undergone within history. For Blanchot, this 
suffering is marked by its neutrality, the suspension o f beings in 
existence—it is affliction. To history we have no recourse, since it 
cannot account for this suffering. Affliction "has lost time altogether. 
It is the horror o f a suffering without end, a suffering time can no 
longer redeem, that has escaped time and for which there is no 
longer recourse; it is irremediable.”*'* In affliction we are delivered 
over to another time, and to history and time as continuum we can 
no longer appeal.
Blanchot relates a story about a young man forced to work 
directly in the extermination process. He writes, "[H]e had suffered 
the worst, led his family to the crematorium, hanged himself; after 
being saved at the last moment—how can one say that: s a v e d ? - - h t  
was exempted from contact with dead bodies, but when the SS shot 
someone, he was obliged to hold the victim's head.”*̂  The young 
prisoner has indeed suffered. Blanchot goes on:
When asked how he could bear this, he is 
supposed to have answered that he "observed 
the comportment o f men before death." 1 will 
not believe it. As Lewental, whose notes were 
found buried near a crematorium, wrote to us,
"The truth was always more atrocious, more 
tragic than what w ill be said about it." Saved 
at the last minute, the young man o f whom I 
speak was forced to live that last instant
*3 Blanchot, The Infinite C onversation , 44.
*4 Ibid., 172.
Blanchot, The W riting o f  the D isaster, 82.
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again and each time to live it once more, 
frustrated every time o f his own death and 
made to exchange it every time for the death 
of all. His response...was not a response; he 
could not respond. What remains for us to 
recognize in this account is that when he was 
faced with an impossible question, he could 
find no other alibi than the search for 
knowledge, the so-called dignity of  
kn ow ledge....86
For Blanchot, it is unbelievable that the humanistic notion o f the 
dignity o f  those facing death actually sustained the young prisoner.
In fact, we, too, must question this notion. If testimony has taught us 
anything about death in the camps, it is that life was accorded no 
dignity, and death even less. Those being led to their death usually 
did not even know they were going to die (the best example here 
being the gas chambers, which were disguised as showers). But 
Blanchot is questioning the survivor's account only by default; the 
error, he holds, lies in the question. The survivor cannot account for 
how he survived, how he could bear this horror, and by putting this 
"impossible question" to him, we force him to come up with an "alibi."
Blanchot's point is that affliction (the affliction o f suffering, the 
affliction o f  surviving) can only enter into discourse pedantically, 
which is to say, it cannot enter into discourse. If Nietzsche's work 
should teach us anything, Pierre Klossowski might say, then it is this: 
the singular cannot be expressed, for expression belongs to the 
gregarious, t o  p r o s t i t u t i o n . ^ ^  In order to respond, the survivor must
86 Ibid., 82.
87 Cf. Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious C ircle, trans. by Daniel W. 
Smith (Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1997), esp. chapters 2 and 4
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capitulate, in some sense, to the expectations put upon him.
Discourse, thus, cannot capture affliction, affliction would be its other. 
It thus lies outside discourse, outside power, and outside any "why"— 
any reasons we may put forth for it. It is an-archic, it has no source,
and the history that gives rise to it cannot account for it.
As an historical event, an event with a date, we can approach 
the Shoah geographically, perhaps even topologically. We can 
number the camps, list the dead, describe the processes of  
destruction. We can narrate the events, expose the Nazi bureacracy, 
and try and execute the criminals. But it is never enough. We 
cannot redeem it; history cannot redeem it, because it is an 
interruption o f  history. It is the "absolute event," as Blanchot says, 
and as such, it is forever other, the other for discourse and the other
for us. At the end o f his aphorism discussing the young prisoner at
Auschwitz, Blanchot writes, "The wish o f all, in the camps, the last 
wish: know what has happened, do not forget, and at the same time 
never will you know.”** Or as Charlotte Delbo says, "Try to look. Just 
try and see."
** Blanchot, The Writing o f  the D isaster, 82.
Chapter 3
A. Gascar and the "Season o f  the Dead"
The SS waged a war against ceremonialized death; it was, of  
course, one o f  their central weapons in the dehumanization process. 
Robert Antelme notes this in The Human Race. Interned in a non- 
Jewish labor camp, Antelme returns from work one day to find two 
men carrying the corpse o f a dead Frenchman under the eyes o f an 
SS sentry. "Three men: two guys to carry the dead man, and the 
sentry," he writes. "One more and it would have been a ceremony. 
The SS wouldn't have permitted it. The dead mustn't be allowed to 
serve as a symbol for us.”*̂  The ceremony would bring the prisoners 
together, perhaps stirring sentiments o f  camaraderie and national 
pride (most o f  the prisoners were French): dangers to the 
dehumanization process. "Like our sleeping, like our pissing, our 
natural death is tolerated, but no trace o f  it may be left behind, 
either in memory or in space. There must be no way o f  situating the 
place where a dead man lies.” °̂ The ceremony must be abolished for 
the dehumanization process to succeed.
The cemetery, in the "ordinary" world, functions as a site and a 
means for preserving identity. The dead are "laid to rest" in a 
marked grave, strewn with flowers, tended with care. The funeral is 
a means o f weaving the death o f  a loved one into the consciousness 
o f those left behind. As Heidegger says, the rituals o f death are
Antelme, 92.
90 Ibid., 92.
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"tranquillization[s] not only for him who is 'dying' but just as much 
for those who 'console' him.”^̂  Death, here, is ceremonialized. It is 
not anonymous, but consoling, reassuring. It is ritualized, and the 
ritual embodies continuity.
In Pierre Gascar's "The Season o f the Dead," Gascar tells the 
story o f a group o f French prisoners o f  war who tend such a 
cemetery. Caught up in the pretenses o f ceremony in the cemetery, 
the prisoners manage to sustain a meaningful existence through the 
rituals o f  death. Their cemetery has meandering paths, planted 
flowers, and green grass. Here the dead are not stuffed into 
crematoria or thrown into mass graves, but, rather, are gently laid to 
rest. But the prisoners' fragile world is threatened: deportation 
trains pass the camp on a regular basis. Forced to witness the 
destruction o f a people and finally, to face atrocity directly, the quiet, 
ceremonialized life o f  the prisoners dissolves.
A s the tenders o f the graveyard, the prisoners maintain a 
certain distance from the destruction occurring all around them.
In the graveyard we led that orderly 
existence depicted in old paintings and, even 
more, in old tapestries and mosaics. A  man 
sitting beside a clump o f anemones, another 
cutting grass with a scythe; water, and 
somebody lying flat on his belly drinking, and 
somebody else with his eyes turned skyward, 
drawing water in a yellow  jug....^^
H eidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962) 298.
92 Pierre Gascar, “The Season o f  the Dead,” from Art from  the Ashes, ed. by 
Lawrence L. Langer, trans. by Jean Stewart (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995) 433.
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The prisoners maintain a sense o f dwelling where they are in touch 
with the natural world and perform meaningful work. Here the 
pastoral sentiments seem a return to an innocent simplicity. Indeed, 
Gascar refers to the graveyard as the "only innocent place" and 
describes the prisoners finding there a "sort o f i m m u n i t y .
But their immunity is quickly destroyed. As the SS begin to 
arrive in the province in order to deport and kill the local Jews and 
dissidents, the prisoners seek refuge increasingly often in the 
graveyard. And then one day, while attempting to dig a trench to 
divert water, the narrator strikes a decomposing corpse with his 
spade. Terrified, the prisoners try to bury it again. One o f them 
suggests making a cross o f  branches, and they move on to another 
location to dig their trench. But now the corpses are uncovered 
rapidly. First one, then three more are revealed. The prisoners have 
opened a mass grave, and the civilian clothing suggests these dead 
were Jews.
"I was overwhelmed by the somber horror o f  it and the truth it 
revealed," the narrator says.
This was death—these liquefying muscles, this 
half-eaten eye, those teeth like a dead 
sheep's; death, no longer decked with grasses, 
no longer ensconced in the coolness o f  a vault, 
no longer sepulchred in stone, but sprawling 
in a bog full o f  bones, wrapped in a drowned 
man's clothes, with its hair caught in the 
earth.94
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Here, where death puts on a sacred mask, the horror o f atrocity and 
mass murder rears its head, and the sanctity o f the graveyard is 
destroyed. The totality o f the same, embodied in the graveyard, is 
here put in question by atrocity. Ceremonialized death has served 
the prisoners as their "innocent place," a kind o f security against the 
terrors o f  war and the catastrophe being wrought on the Jews. The 
cemetery has become for the prisoners a site in the sense Levinas 
gives to that term. "Dwelling," Levinas writes, "is the very mode o f  
maintaining oneself..sls the body that...holds i t s e l f  up and can.... The 
site, a medium, affords means.”^̂  confronted with the corpses in
the mass grave, the prisoners can no longer turn away. All security 
is destroyed. This was death, our narrator says, and it is not the 
death o f  the funeral or wake but mass murder, the corpses relegated 
to an unmarked grave. Overwhelmed, the narrator admits his 
inability to cope with the situation. He is horrified.
"The look...finds," Blanchot says, "in what makes it possible, the 
power that neutralizes it...."^6 The subject is overwhelmed. In the 
narrator’s horror, the corpse, the existent, neutralizes the subject, but 
it also nullifies the horizon. The existent, the corpse, puts the entire 
meaning o f  the cemetery in question. Whereas the cemetery, as 
Gascar points out, reveals an idyllic sense o f communion with nature, 
arid undoubtedly with ancestry, the mass grave, covered over, 
hidden by the perpetrators, makes no such reference. "In
Levinas, T otality  and Infinity, 37.
Blanchot, The Space o f  L iterature, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln, Nebraska: 
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fascination," Gerald Bruns writes, "everything is withdrawn from the 
world.... "97
"Whoever is fascinated doesn't see, properly speaking, what he 
sees. Rather, it touches him in an immediate proximity; it seizes and 
ceaselessly draws him close, even though it leaves him absolutely at 
a distance."98 The gaze, “properly speaking," would be power, much 
like Foucault's panoptic gaze. But here the gaze o f power is 
neutralized, overwhelmed. It is reduced to proximity; both a 
closeness and a distance. We would like to call it height in Levinas' 
sense o f the term, but here the Other is destroyed, mutilated. The 
horror o f  this fascination is rooted in this recognition. As Heidegger 
notes, the corpse is not a thing like other things, "This something 
which is just-present-at-hand-and-no-more is 'more' than a l ife le ss  
material Thing. In it we encounter something unalive, which has lost 
its l i f e . " 9 9  The destruction o f  the Other, in the fascination atrocity 
demands, opens onto the neutral. "Fascination," Blanchot writes, "is 
fundamentally linked to neutral, impersonal presence, to the 
indeterminate They, the immense, faceless Someone."i®® The 
anonymity o f  the destroyed Other, found in the mass grave amid the 
murdered, opens the subject, which is now no longer a subject, to the 
neutral. As Levinas says, "Horror is somehow a movement which
97 Gerald Bruns, M aurice B lanchot (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University  
Press, 1997) 60.
98 Blanchot, The Space o f  L iterature, 33.
99 Heidegger, Being and Time, 282.
'99 Blanchot, The Space o f  L iterature, 33
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will strip consciousness o f its very subjectivity.” ®̂! Anonymous 
being, the faceless Someone: the horror o f  atrocity.
The encounter opens, thus, onto what Blanchot calls the neutral 
and what Levinas calls the il y  a, the there is. Levinas characterizes 
the il y  a  as this "impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable 
'consummation' o f  being, which murmurs in the depths of  
nothingness itself.... The there is, inasmuch as it resists a personal 
form, is 'being in general.’”!®̂  But this is no longer being as space or 
time, as "receptable for objects, as a means o f  access to beings"—it is 
not Heidegger's being in which all things participate.!®^ It is, rather, 
the murmur o f  the being o f the void, that which is there when 
nothing is there, the rumble in the night. It is a "universal absence 
[which] is in its turn a presence, an absolutely unavoidable 
presen ce.”!®*! b  is, as Levinas says, "like the monotonous presence 
that bears down on us in insomnia.”!®̂
Horror opens us to the il y  a. In horror, as in fascination (for, 
as Bruns points out, horror is "...the highest form o f fascination..."), 
the subject is neutralized, depersonalized. "Horror," Levinas tells us, 
"is nowise an anxiety about death.”!®® Rather, "...horror turns the 
subjectivity o f the subject...inside out. It is a participation in the 
there /5-..in the there is that has 'no exits.”’!®̂  Horror neutralizes the
!®! Levinas, “There is: Existence without Existents,” from The Levinas Reader,
ed. by Sean Hand, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Cambridge, Massachusettes:
Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1989) 32.
!®2 Ibid., 30.
!®3 Ibid , 32.
!®4 Ibid., 30.
!05 Ibid., 32.
!®6 Ibid., 33.
!®7 Ibid., 33.
43
subject. But here subjectivity undergoes yet another transformation; 
in the neutralization o f the subject, passivity ensues. It is for this 
reason that we must stay close to Blanchot's term 'fascination' since it
implies the sense of passivity o f the il y  a  and the neutral. As
Levinas says, horror does not lull consciousness into unconsciousness, 
but throws it into "an impersonal vigilance, & partic ipa tion .
Horror opens the subject to passivity.
It is this horror that Gascar's prisoners try to work against.
After uncovering the mass grave, they attempt to "embroider" over 
the corpses, in an effort to dismiss the atrocity. "On the fringe o f the 
war, on the fringe o f the massacres, on the fringe of Europe, 
sheltering behind our prodigious burial-ground, we seemed like 
hollow -eyed gardeners, sitters in the sun, fanatical weeders, busily 
working over the dead as over some piece o f embroidery.”i°9 They 
attempt to cover over, both literally and figuratively, the murdered 
they have uncovered.
But their efforts unravel. A stonemason in the camp is called 
to carve tombstones for the German dead buried in the graveyard,
and he is to use stones stolen from the Jewish cemetery in a nearby
town. Our narrator confronts him and attempts to convince the 
mason not to use the stones, but in the end, he relents. While the 
mason rambles on about the stones, the narrator quits listening:
I was no longer listening to him. For the last 
few  minutes I had been listening to the
rumble o f a train and now it was growing
108 Ibid., 32.
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louder. The train was about to emerge round 
the tip o f  the wood. I could tell, without 
waiting for it to roll past before my eyes, 
what sort o f freight it carried. Its slow, jolting 
sound warned me o f  the other sounds that 
would follow  although for the moment a 
contrary wind delayed them. I should soon 
hear the weeping, the cries o f  despair. The 
silence, no doubt, was due to the wind; but 
perhaps, too, those who were being 
transported, knowing what fate awaited them, 
had deliberately refrained from sending out 
their lamentations into that empty, sun-baked 
plain, in which the great migrations o f death 
had never yet awakened any lasting echo.^i®
The prisoners can no longer turn away from the catastrophe
surrounding them. The graveyard, work as they might, remains a
mass grave, and the deportation trains continue to rumble past. The
terror is everywhere.
In a final effort, the prisoners begin helping a Jewish partisan 
named Lebovitch. At night, Lebovitch hides, paradoxically, in an 
unused grave, and the prisoners leave him food and water during the 
day. To save this one man would be to achieve some kind o f return 
to the world o f  justice and order, hut even this is denied. Lebovitch 
is found out, and the prisoners simply find his hiding place empty, 
his jacket lying in the dirt.
In the end, the narrator frightens even the woman he has been 
courting from a distance. The mass graves, the deportations, and the 
murder o f  Lebovitch: the narrator tries to escape all this through a 
passionate moment with the young woman. However, he frightens
110 Ibid., 463.
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her and she flees. "I leaned against a tree," he says. "Within me and 
about me a great silence had fallen. After a moment I wiped away 
my tears and went back to my dead.’’^  He has been initiated into 
the terror.
The narrator returns to the dead as a member o f a new 
community. No longer pagan or Greek, no longer bound to the 
cemetery and to the land, the narrator has been initiated into the 
community o f  witnesses. The deportation trains and the murders 
have opened him to a new responsibility; the weight of Others, 
murdered, destroyed, afflicted, overwhelms him, and in that 
overwhelming binds him.
B. Exposure and humanism
Gascar's narrator has been exposed to the Shoah's destruction. 
In this exposure, horrified fascination strips subjectivity o f its power 
and mastery, o f  its horizons. Awash in the destruction and exposed 
to the suffering o f  others, the narrator cannot transcend the horror; 
the deportation trains, mass graves, and murder. He is exposed to 
the il y  a, the neutral, and in this exposure he enters a vigilance, 
participates in the il y  a. There is no subject o f mastery, but only 
this vigilance and participation, marked by witnessing the 
annihilation o f  others.
To be exposed to the destruction o f the Shoah, as we have said, 
is to be exposed to the neutral, the Outside, the il y  a. Here, in
111 Ibid., 470.
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horrified fascination, the subject is powerless; no mastery or 
possession here marks subjectivity. It can no longer transcend what 
horrifies and fascinates it. The horizons have all been nullified. It is 
thus that, in a discussion o f  messianic thought, Blanchot asks the 
question: "How is it possible to say: Auschwitz has happened?. 
Christian and political messianism is always a thought o f the end, o f a 
"just finish."^ 13 But the interruption o f  history, the ultimate suffering 
at Auschwitz, precludes this end. To say that Auschwitz has 
happened is to draw a close to the event which cannot be closed. The 
exposure to the Outside interrupts this ending. It is on these terms, 
it seems, that Blanchot says, "He who has been the contemporary o f  
the camps is forever a survivor..
Which is all to say that, as the moment in history which cannot 
be appropriated, the Shoah is, for thought, the other. It is an 
interruption o f  history in history itself. As such, the Shoah cannot be 
appropriated by thought. Only the neutralization o f  alterity can once 
again institute power. Greek thought, pagan thought, is always a 
thought o f power, o f assimilation and appropriation. As Levinas 
says:
If an exterior and foreign being is to 
surrender itse lf to intermediaries there must 
be produced somewhere a great "betrayal."
As far as things are concerned, a surrender is 
carried out in their conceptualization. As for 
man, it can be obtained by the terror that 
brings a free man under the domination o f
112 Blanchot, The W riting o f  the D isaster, 143.
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another. For the things the work o f ontology 
consists in apprehending the individual 
(which alone exists) not in its individuality 
but in its generality (o f which alone there is 
science). The relation with the other is here 
accomplished only through a third term which 
I find in myself. The ideal o f  the Socratic 
truth thus rests on the essential self- 
sufficiency o f  the same, its identification 
in...its egoism. Philosophy is an egology.^s
Thus it is that philosophy is always appropriation and assimilation.
The relation with the other always occurs within the horizon o f being
(Levinas' third term), and as such, is neutralized. But the Shoah
nullifies all horizons, and thus, ontology, paganism, cannot account
for our relation with it.
Exposed to the Outside, thought can no longer appropriate and 
assimilate, but rather, merely participates in neutrality. It is 
transformed into vigilance, a vigilance no longer located within an 
egology, but dispersed: the nomadic. The exposed is perpetually 
nomadic. Aharon Appelfeld has emphasized this point in his work 
For Every Sin. Theo, a survivor o f the camps who is trying to return 
home, is constantly confronted by other refugees. They sit under 
trees, smoke cigarettes, play poker, lay on the ground. When they 
move, they move slowly, or angrily, though their anger always 
subsides quickly. They are adrift. Theo despises them; he finds their 
idleness annoying. But he slowly recognizes his own struggle in 
theirs: there is nowhere to go, nowhere to return to. In the end, he 
joins their numbers, the ranks o f  the homeless. As his friend tells
Levinas, Totality  and Infinity, 44
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him: "There's no sense seeking something that can never be 
a t t a i n e d . T h e r e  is no home to return to; the exposed are nomads.
Thus, the exposed belong to this other humanism, this Jewish 
humanism, which recalls us to the "exigency o f strangeness.
Gascar's narrator has been exposed to the destruction o f the Shoah, 
and as such, has been exposed to the Outside. He has been initiated 
into this other humanism, wherein the exposure puts the subject in 
question and the mastery and power o f  the pagan dwelling has been 
abolished. This other humanism is a humanism o f exposure and 
speech: exposure to the Outside, and speech as the space where 
distance is maintained even in address. The community o f  witnesses 
is bound by this exposure, by this humanism. Through the mouth of  
Yukel, a survivor, Edmond Jabes writes, "In a village in central 
Europe, the Nazis one day buried some o f  our brothers alive. The soil 
shifted with them for a long time. That night, one and the same 
rhythm bound Israelites to the w o r l d . T h e  witness, too, is bound 
to the world through the suffering he has witnessed. He is thrust, in 
his fascinated horror, in his witnessing, into the catastrophe, and he 
is now bound by the ceaseless appeal o f  Auschwitz.
) Aharon Appelfeld, For Every Sin, trans. by Jeffrey M. Green (New York: 
Grove Press, 1989) 167-8.
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Chapter 4
A. Interruption
We have seen that our traditional notions o f  subjectivity cannot 
account for the experience (if, indeed, we can continue to use this 
word) o f  the camps. The suffering o f  the victims and the 
Muselmanner, and the horrified fascination o f the witness, both open 
onto the neutral. Suffering as an-other time, a time without end and 
without recourse, inaugurates the neutral, anonymous space o f the il 
y  a. In fascination, the horizons crumble and the witness as 
subjectivity dissolves. In the anonymity o f the neutral, paganism 
can no longer answer to the fundamental relation, the relation to 
others and the exterior. Nomadism is the mode o f  the perpetually 
exposed, and it defines the community o f  survivors and witnesses.
This exposure is fundamentally a stripping o f  power. The 
horizon, against which subjectivity can measure, collapses in the face 
o f the Shoah. No longer is the subject whole and identified, no longer 
can it proceed from the site o f dwelling. Rather, the subject dissolves 
into the anonymous. Here, in the nameless night, in the undeniable 
presence o f this absence, there is only vigilance and passivity, the 
silent ruins o f the site.
But the question remains: how do we encounter the Shoah?
Ontology, philosophy, is power. It is the power to neutralize 
alterity. Being provides measure, the horizon against which all 
existents are measured. It is only herein that existents can take on
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their familiarity, for here the existent is subsumed beneath a general 
theme: being. Being, in this sense, not only provides horizon, but is 
the horizon itself. It is the "against-which" that allows 
comprehension, the horizon that allows things to be understood in 
their generality. Ontology is power.
For Levinas, this power is put in question by the encounter 
with the Other. In the face I encounter alterity and, as such, am put 
in question. I must respond, and as Blanchot points out, 1 must 
respond either in speech (thus entering into relation with the infinite 
while maintaining that absolute alterity) or through mortal violence 
(destroying that alterity which puts my power in question). In the 
encounter with the Other the horizon o f being is nullified. Thus, the 
power o f  ontology is interrupted by alterity, by this alterity that, in 
encounter, cannot be reduced without some kind o f  response.
Blanchot sees a similar encounter in testimony. He writes, 
"...Auschwitz...im poses, through testimony, the indefeasible duty not 
to forget....”**̂  Testimony, as we have seen, is this encounter with the 
Other. Levi's curse demands we face this other man who is fighting 
for scraps in the mud. Delbo's narratives demand that we recognize 
(at the very least, recognize) that, i f  we believe we can comprehend 
her narratives, we are deceiving ourselves. Here, in both instances, 
the power o f subjectivity is put in question, and not only subjective 
power, but power itself. Thought cannot think the other except by 
neutralizing it. When Levinas tells us that ontology can only 
understand things in their generality, that is, scientifically, we must
Blanchot, “Do Not Forget,” 247.
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understand by this that ontology can only understand things within 
the measure o f  comprehension and totality: precisely what Levi and 
Delbo especially deny in relation to the Shoah. What testimony 
denies is that power (the power o f subjectivity or the power o f  
philosophy, etc.) can measure it.
After all, what is thought called upon to think here? Not dates 
and names, not locations and numbers. Rather, thought is here called 
upon to think the neutral, to think fascination and to think suffering. 
Thought, philosophy, is here exposed, and as such, deposed. It 
cannot contain the neutral, but, in turn, can only be fascinated or
horrified by it. History cannot contain the interruption o f history
since the interruption exceeds history's power to reduce it.
Philosophy cannot contain the Shoah, because the Shoah will always 
be the denial o f  power; because the Shoah, as we have said, is the
immediacy o f  suffering, and philosophy is always the mediated;
because the Shoah is the event without horizon, and philosophy is 
always the horizon.
A fragment o f Blanchot's might be useful here. He writes:
The correct criticism o f the System does not 
consist (as is most often, complacently, 
supposed) in finding fault with it, or in 
interpreting it insufficiently (which even
Heidegger sometimes does), but rather in
rendering it invincible, invulnerable to
criticism or, as they say, inevitable. Then,
since nothing escapes it because o f its 
omnipresent unity and the perfect cohesion of  
everything, there remains no place for 
fragmentary writing unless it come into focus 
as the impossible necessary: as that which is 
written in the time outside time, in the sheer
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suspense which without restraint breaks the 
seal o f  unity by, precisely, not breaking it, but 
by leaving it aside without this abandon's 
ever being able to be known. It is thus, 
inasmuch as it separates itse lf from the 
manifest, that fragmentary writing does not 
belong to the One.^^o
Philosophy, the System, the concept, is, for Blanchot, occupational;
they are totalities that dictate certain understandings. Here he is
very close to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari when they write, "The
concept is the contour, the configuration, the constellation o f an event
to come.... The task o f  philosophy when it creates concepts...is always
to extract an event from things and beings, to set up the new event
from things and b e i n g s . . . . ” ^ 2 1  Philosophy is not only, as Levinas says,
an egology, but it is also totalitarian in its power. It occupies thought
much like an army occupies a conquered land.^22
120 Blanchot, The W riting o f  the D isaster, 61.
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The fragment, for Blanchot, breaks with this totalitarianism. 
Totalitarianism is not fought by replacing the old regime with a new  
one, but rather by interruption. He writes:
[AJffirm the b r e a k . . break? The break 
with the powers that be, hence with the 
notion o f  power, hence everywhere that 
power predominates. This obviously applies 
to the University, to the idea o f knowledge, to 
the language relations to be found in teaching, 
in leading, perhaps to all language, etc., but 
applies even more to our own conception of 
opposition to the powers that be, each time 
such opposition constitutes itse lf to become a 
party in power.*23
And further:
This theoretical undertaking obviously does 
not entail drawing up a programme or a 
platform, but rather, independent o f any 
programmatic project, indeed o f any project, 
maintaining a refusal that is an affirmation, 
bringing out or maintaining an affirmation 
that does not come to any arrangements, but 
rather undoes arrangements, including its 
own, since it is in relation with dis­
arrangement or disarray or else the non-
structurable.*24
The fragment functions in Blanchot's work as this kind o f  
interruption o f  the totality o f  the System; where the System occupies 
totally, the fragment appears and is difference. For Blanchot, there is
only the affirmation o f  disturbance and interruption.
The irruption o f  difference within the totality (interruption), 
thus puts the totality in question without destroying or replacing it.
123 Blanchot, “Disorderly Words,” 200.
124 Ibid., 201.
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The interruption cannot be appropriated; it is a refusal, a nomadic 
irruption. And not only does the Jew serve as this refusal for the 
anti-Semite and the Nazi regime, but the Shoah is this refusal within 
the totality o f  history and the discourse o f philosophy. Suffering, 
horror, the neutral; these escape the positivity o f the concept. As the 
interruption o f history, ' as the without-end, Auschwitz and the Shoah 
cannot be conceptualized—they always escape the concept.
Here Blanchot's notion o f "un-knowledge" proves helpful. He 
writes, "Un-knowledge is not a lack o f  knowledge; it is not even 
knowledge o f  the lack but rather that which is hidden by knowledge 
and ignorance alike: the neutral, the u n - m a n i f e s t . ” ^26 Knowledge 
"hides" the neutral, covers it over. It always appropriates and 
assimilates. Un-knowledge, then, would be a relation that does not 
assimilate, that does not appropriate and reduce. Rather, it 
participates: it sustains a relation with alterity that does not do 
mortal violence. It affirms alterity and affirms interruption in its 
alterity. "Enough o f theory which wields and organizes knowledge," 
he writes. 127 Rather, he wants to inaugurate a new knowledge, an 
un-knowledge. "When knowledge is no longer a knowledge o f truth, 
it is then that knowledge starts: a knowledge that bums thought, like 
knowledge o f  infinite patience.”12» This un-knowledge is the
125 In no way do I mean to im ply here that the Shoah, as catastrophic event, 
should be affirmed, for exam ple, in lieu o f  some theoretical or political end. 
Rather, what must be recognized, and this sense, affirmed, is difference, the 
difference the Shoah presents w ithin history. Not to recognize this would be 
to set the entire apparatus o f  power back in motion, thus subsuming this 
moment within the totality o f  discourse.
126 Blanchot, The Writing o f  the D isaster, 63.
127 Ibid., 43.
128 Ibid., 43.
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participation in the neutral, the relation with alterity that does not, 
as Greek or pagan thought does, reduce, assimilate, and appropriate.
Which is to say that the Shoah remains for thought, for Greek 
thought and for ontology, the other. When Blanchot writes, 
"...Auschwitz...imposes, through testimony, the indefeasible duty not 
to forget: remember, beware o f  forgetfulness and yet, in that faithful 
memory, never will you know," he circumscribes this interruption.*̂ 9 
Do not forget: the interruption, the break with the whole, the 
exigency o f alterity initiates us into "an interminable anamnesis. 
Nevertheless, never w ill we know. Thus, when Blanchot asks, in The 
Writing o f  the Disaster, "How can thought be made the keeper o f  the 
holocaust where all was lost, including guardian thought?," we must 
answer (with him, I think) that thought cannot be made this 
k e e p e r .131 The interruption cannot be appropriated, cannot be 
assimilated. The thought o f  power and the site, Greek and pagan 
thought, cannot withstand the exigency o f the Shoah. Thus, we must 
answer Blanchot's question: thought cannot be the keeper o f the 
Shoah, i f  we mean by thought the power to understand, to grasp and 
to redeem. Only a thought which could sustain itself outside power 
and occupation could be made the keeper o f  the Shoah.
Blanchot's notion o f  Jewish humanism pushes toward this other 
relation that interruption inaugurates. Its nomadism releases 
thought from its ties to the site and dwelling, the sources o f power.
It is a relation with otherness that affirms alterity, that does not flee
129 Blanchot, “Do Not Forget,” 247-8.
130 Ibid., 249
131 Blanchot, The Writing o f  the D isaster, 47.
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before it. Here there is a relation with Others as  Others, with 
exteriority. The question is: in what sense can we say this other 
humanism is the k e e p e r  o f the Shoah?
Insofar as this humanism does not reduce difference or 
assimilate the Other, insofar as it does not neutralize alterity, it 
sustains the mode o f  relation that the Shoah demands. When Delbo 
writes, "Try to look. Just try and see," she attempts to secure the 
alterity o f  her narrative, to deny the reader's ability to appropriate 
it .‘32 She demands that we encounter her narrated experience 
without appropriating it, without weaving the discontinuous into the 
continuous. This humanism would speak to this end. In this relation, 
what is proximal nevertheless remains distant; its relation is one o f  
sustaining difference. As Blanchot says, in this relation "[djistance is 
not abolished, it is not even diminished; on the contrary, it is 
maintained, preserved in its purity....”‘33
In this other humanism there is no mediation introduced into 
the relation. In Heideggerian ontology, neutralization is wrought a 
priori-, everything occurs in being. But for Jewish humanism, the 
only landscape is that o f  speech, the speech that does not reduce 
difference but rather sustains it: my addressing the Other. In the 
address no third term is introduced; there is only the address o f one 
to the other, the speech o f proximity that does not reduce. As 
Blanchot says, "Judaism is the sole thought that does not m e d i a t e .” ‘ 34
‘32 Delbo, None o f  Us Will Return, 84.
‘33 Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” 233 
‘34 Blanchot, The W riting o f  the D isaster, 63.
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But the question o f  keeping the Shoah here is revealed as a 
fruitless one. When we ask about keeping, are we not still Greeks 
and pagans? Do we not still seek power? Ultimately, yes, we do.
The interrogations o f  philosophy, power, subjectivity, etc., that we 
have engaged in the thought o f  Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice 
Blanchot reveal, i f  nothing else, one fundamental insight: knowledge 
is a power relation. For ontology, and for philosophy and 
subjectivity, knowledge is the neutralization o f alterity through 
mediation. Power pervades philosophy and thought. And i f  we ask 
for a thought that could keep the Shoah, whatever that might mean, 
then we are asking for a thought that could encompass it, embrace it, 
and make o f it a thing to be understood.
And this is the heart o f this other humanism: it is a thought of 
relation, i f  it is a thought at all. It is the mode o f encounter when the 
power that drives philosophy and subjectivity is stripped. It is not 
an encompassing thought, but a mode o f  encounter, a mode o f  
encountering the unknown, the foreign, and the strange. It does not 
gather, does not render, and does not appropriate It is the name o f
135 Philosophy must, in this sense, becom e the question o f  philosophy, which 
also means that philosophy must becom e the question o f power. It is thus, it 
seem s, that Blanchot occupies that strange space between theory and 
literature, between the philosopher and the writer. It is as though Blanchot 
attempts to sustain a questioning outside the bounds o f philosophy as 
organizational discourse. His notion o f  nomadism would "fit" this "model." 
Nomadism engages totalities from outside without setting itse lf up as the new 
apparatus o f  power. Philosophy must begin to heed this call (and it is also the 
call, I think, o f  Deleuze and Guattari). Contemporary continental theory has 
done just this: from Nietzsche to Heidegger, and from Heidegger to Derrida, 
Blanchot, Levinas, D eleuze, etc., the history o f  twentieth-century continental 
theory can be read as the questioning o f  the philosophy o f  the subject, and, 
thus, the questioning o f  philosophy itself.
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the relation between two existents when they find themselves face 
to face and disoriented, absolutely disoriented.
Thus, this other humanism is not the keeper o f the Shoah. 
Rather, it is the way in which we must encounter the Shoah. Levi's 
curse does not demand our understanding, but only our encountering 
o f this other. The Shoah and its testimony will always be the 
interruption o f  the continuous, the interruption o f discourse. Thus, 
there is no keeper o f  the Shoah, for it escapes all bounds. We are left 
only with our responsibility.
B. Our Position
Our relation with the Shoah, with testimony, is defined by 
encounter, not knowledge. If we return to Levi's curse, we must 
remember that he calls us forth to encounter the Other, to "consider 
i f  this is a man" who fights for scraps o f bread, who dies because o f a 
yes or a no. We must face this Other, Levi holds, and we sense in this 
our responsibility as the inheritors o f  history. The Other, dying, 
destroyed, no longer even really an identity, opens the exigency o f  
the Shoah, and we must, as Levinas tells us, respond. Our 
responsibility is born o f  this encounter.
This responsibility is bom  out o f encounter, out o f the 
encounter wherein the Other strips me o f  my power to remain 
myself. In the "moment" when power is arrested, in the time o f the 
encounter which is anterior to being and to time (the time o f  
encountering the face or the horrible), responsibility is bora. And it
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is the gravest o f  responsibilities: not that responsibility o f duties or 
deeds, but the responsibility o f  one human being to another, called 
out, naked, stripped o f all power. And returned to oneself, one's 
unique self, only in the bound form o f the hostage. If I hear the 
Other, I am bound to the Other.
This responsibility, Levinas tells us, is:
A responsibility stemming from a time before 
m y freedom—before my beginning, before 
any present. A fraternity existing in extreme 
separation.... Responsibility for my neighbor 
dates from before my freedom in an 
immemorial past, an unrepresentable past 
that was never present and is more ancient 
than consciousness of... A responsibility for 
my neighbor, for the other man, for the 
stranger or sojourner, to which nothing in the 
rigorously ontological order binds me— 
nothing in the order o f  the thing, o f the 
something, o f  number or causality.
It is the responsibility o f a h o s t a g e .  . .  1^6
This responsibility is bom o f encounter, the very encounter Levi 
demands in his curse. But here Levinas draws us toward Blanchot's 
notion o f  this other humanism more than ever, for here, I am bound 
completely to the Other, beyond any ordered reality and anterior to 
any commitments. The Other has here bound me to him, in his very 
address, in his face. This is not a demand that the ordered world can 
answer to, a demand like Kant's Categorical Imperative, to which all 
rational beings must adhere. No; this demand is made upon me and 
me only, drawing me out to account for it. As Levinas says, "In the
136 Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy,” from The Levinas Reader, ed. by Sean 
Hand, trans. by Sean Hand and Michael Temple, 84
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face o f  the other man I am inescapably responsible and consequently 
the unique and chosen one [my emphasis].” 3̂7 / must respond; / a m  
responsible. I am, in a very important sense, a hostage.
Thus, in the encounter, T  am dissolved, stripped o f my power
and identity. But I am also returned, but this return has its own 
transfiguration. Blanchot tells us:
The hostage is the nonconsenting, the 
unchosen guarantee o f a promise he hasn't 
made, the irreplaceable one who is not in his 
own place. It is through the other that I am 
the same, through the other that I am myself: 
it is through the other who has always 
withdrawn me from myself. The Other, if  he 
calls upon me, calls upon someone who is not 
I: the first come or least o f men; by no means 
the unique being I would like to be. It is thus 
that he assigns me to passivity..
The return is not the return to the stable identity o f  the same as "I
would like to be." Rather, it is as the hostage, the bound. I am
unique, but I am no longer I: I am the bound one; the one on whom
responsibility for the Other lies. For Blanchot, the encounter with the
Other, this responsibility, is a kind o f transfiguration.
Thus, in this other humanism we are bound to the Other, not by 
an order in the world, but by this responsibility. The encounter with 
the Other, which strips subjectivity o f all power and identity, calls 
me out in my responsibility. I am bound to the Other "prior to" all 
ontological orders. Thus, responsibility opens in the "moment" when 
power is arrested, in the moment when subjectivity no longer rules.
137 Ibid., 84.
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It is this relation, our relation with the Other, to which Blanchot holds 
paganism and ontology does not hold the "key.”*39
Nevertheless, as Blanchot reminds us at the end o f his essay on 
being Jewish, human power, the power o f  subjectivity, is "capable o f  
any thing. He writes:
Anti-Semitism, in this sense, is in no way 
accidental; it gives a figure to the repulsion 
inspired by the Other, the uneasiness before 
what comes from afar and elsewhere: the 
need to kill the Other, that is, to submit to the 
all-powerfulness o f  death what cannot be 
measured in terms o f  power.i^i
For both Blanchot and Levinas, the encounter with the Other
demands responding, whether that response be speech or mortal
v io len ce .  Mortal violence, as Levinas has indicated, is simply an
inverse o f speech, the hateful r e s p o n s e . T h e  Other demands my
response, and anti-Semitism is the response that gives body to the
"repulsion" o f being stripped o f  all identity and power. To use a
Nietzschean term, it is reaction p a r  excellence. Human power is
capable o f  anything because it can refuse, through mortal violence,
even the exigency o f  the Other. But this refusal is nonetheless a
turning toward the exigency o f  the Other. As Blanchot says, "The
anti-Semite, at grips with the infinite, thus commits him self to a
lim itless movement o f refusal."!'*^
139 Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” 232.
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In the encounter with testimony, with Levi's curse and Delbo's 
exteriorized narratives, we are thus thrust into this relation with the 
Other. The question centers around what our relation with the Shoah 
must be. As the "absolute event" o f history, to use Blanchot's terms, 
in what sense can we enter into relation with the Shoah? We must 
encounter it as nomads and hostages. Here is the event which cannot 
be reduced to the historical circumstances that gave rise to it.
History, the thematization and contextualization o f events, would 
have us reduce the Shoah to Hitler's anti-Semitism, Eichmann's 
bureacratic efficacy, the failure o f enlightenment values, etc. But
each contextualization only occults the horror o f the neutral. The
Shoah exceeds all bounds.
Note the visage o f the Muselmann. Blanchot writes, "The 
suffering o f  our time: 'A wasted man, bent head, bowed shoulders, 
unthinking, gaze extinguished' Levi, too, writes:
...if 1 could enclose all the evil o f our time in 
one image, 1 would choose this image which is 
familiar to me: an emaciated man, with head 
dropped and shoulders curved, on whose face
and in whose eyes not a trace o f thought is to
be seen.145
Levi does not choose the image o f the SS man, truncheon in hand 
with a bloodthirsty dog beside him, as his image o f evil. Rather, he 
chooses the visage o f  the Muselmann, destroyed, broken.
Blanchot, The W riting o f  the D isaster, 81. 
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extinguished but still alive. The destruction exceeds even the Nazis' 
power, while nevertheless arising from the Nazi terror.
And this is the paradox o f  the Shoah, it seems. It is the event 
o f history that cannot be reduced to history. It is the break with all 
forms o f totality: the narrative o f history, the power o f subjectivity, 
and even the power o f the totalitarian State. The suffering o f those 
in the camps, the Shoah itself, can only be circumscribed. The break 
can only be circumscribed. But history and subjectivity, philosophy 
and the tyranny o f  the State can always appropriate and neutralize 
alterity. Human power is capable o f anything.
But this appropriation is still a relation with the infinite; it is 
the violent response, the insistence on paganism and the power o f  
the site. But it does not answer to the demand o f the Other; it cannot 
answer to this demand. For in this demand I am stripped o f my 
identity and bound to the Other fundamentally. The refusal o f this 
demand can be realized only violently: in the mortal violence of 
murder or in the neutralizing violence o f  ontology.
The encounter with the Other, by thrusting me into the 
anonymous, exiles me from the site. And in this nomadic space 1 am 
bound to the Other, as a hostage. My responsibility opens in this 
space and it binds me. The body o f this responsibility is speech, the 
speech wherein "[djistance is not abolished, it is not even diminished; 
on the contrary, it is m a i n t a i n e d . . . . j j j  this sense, speech affirms 
distance, affirms the break—it does not reduce. The unknown does
Blanchot, “The Indestructible,” 233.
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not become known, but becomes that which I must bear, as that 
which binds me. The Shoah thus binds the generations which follow.
M y responsibility for the Shoah is not that o f a doer in relation 
to a deed. It is a moral responsibility, but not in this strict sense. 
Rather, it is the responsibility which "precedes," in an immemorial 
past, any kind o f  order or ethics. It is the burning immediacy o f the 
Other's proximity, which is nevertheless defined by distance. It is 
the obliteration o f  the horizon, whether that horizon be history, 
philosophy, subjectivity; it nullifies our power to envelop and 
comprehend and narrate and appropriate. It is the break with 
totality, while always threatened by totalities. And in that break all 
power dissolves. As the inheritors o f  history, as the generations that 
follow catastrophe, we are bound to this break, to this cry.
In a footnote Blanchot writes o f  speech:
With the experience that he draws from 
him self and from his learning, Gerschom 
Scholem has said, speaking o f  the relations 
between the Germans and the Jews: "The 
abyss opened between us by these events 
cannot be measured...For, in truth, it is 
im possible to realize completely what 
happened. Its incomprehensible nature has 
to do with the very essence o f  the 
phenomenon: it is impossible fully to 
understand it, that is to say, integrate it into 
our consciousness." Impossible, therefore, to 
forget it, impossible to remember it. Also 
impossible, in speaking about it, to speak of 
it—and finally, as there is nothing but this
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incomprehensible event to say, it is speech 
alone that must bear it without saying it.î "̂
We must encounter this event, and we cannot comprehend it. Speech
must bear the Shoah without saying it, as if  every homeland were
destroyed, every power abolished, and every horizon toppled.
147 Ibid., 243.
